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8.1  Introduction 
Brazilian economic experience in most of the recent past has been character- 
ized by  unstable growth and high inflation rates. Between 1986 and 1991 the 
economy was subjected to five stabilization plans, which were unable to con- 
trol price pressures. Between 1988 and 1992 real per capita income declined 
by an average rate of 2 percent. In mid- 1994 a new stabilization scheme known 
as the “Real Plan” was implemented, and at least until late 1996 inflation re- 
mained at a low and stable rate.’ The performance of  the economy also im- 
proved: between 1994 and 1995 real GDP grew at an average rate of 5.1 per- 
cent. 
The Constitution of 1988 altered virtually all aspects of fiscal policy. Of par- 
ticular relevance was the reform in social insurance. Mainly because of the new 
constitutional rules, expenditures on  social insurance benefits  and  welfare 
jumped from 2.6 percent of GDP in 1988 to 5.0 percent of GDP in 1995, while 
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1.  The real is the new Brazilian currency; it replaced the cruzeiro. 
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social insurance sources of revenue increased only moderately, from 4.6 to 5.3 
percent of GDP. As expenditures on benefits increased, the traditional procedure 
of allocating part of payroll contributions to public health could no longer be ac- 
complished.  The crisis in social insurance was then extended to public health fi- 
nancing. 
Since 1993 the Brazilian federal government has relied on transitory taxes to 
finance health expenses, while constitutional amendments (including in the so- 
cial insurance system) are being debated in Congress. There is little room, how- 
ever, to address the social insurance crisis in the short run because the level of 
expenditures with existing retirees is fixed and payroll taxes are already consid- 
ered to be at prohibitively high levels. Long-run prospects are dim, as an aging 
population and a decline in total fertility rates signal additional pressures in the 
future. 
Constitutional  amendments in the tax system and in the structure of public ad- 
ministration are also being discussed in Congress. Some of the main issues in the 
tax reform debate include the large number of taxes, overlapping bases of inci- 
dence, and high payroll taxes. The proposal for public administration reform 
aims to contain the level of government consumption expenditure. 
The purpose of this paper is to address how current and alternative fiscal poli- 
cies, like some of those being discussed in Congress, can affect the distribution 
of resources between current and future generations. In addition, it estimates by 
how much the social insurance reforms of 1988  helped the current elderly at the 
expense of their grandchildren.  The general conclusion is that the actual path of 
fiscal policies, coupled with the demographic  transition, imposes a heavy burden 
on future generations of Brazilians. 
To bring the issues into perspective, section 8.2 summarizes major facets of 
economic policy in Brazil since 1988, as well as the course of some recent de- 
bates on fiscal reform. Section 8.3  presents a description of data sources used in 
the calculations. Brazilian baseline generational accounts for 1995 are reported 
in section 8.4,  That section also investigates the impact of changes in social in- 
surance, performs a sensitivity analysis for different choices of parameters, in- 
cluding the evolution of the population, and examines the implications of alter- 
native fiscal policies for intergenerational balance. A  summary of  the main 
results and general conclusions is presented in section 8.5. 
8.2  Summary of  Recent Fiscal Policies and Current Fiscal Debates 
In  1986, after 22 years of military regimes, Brazilians were eager to adopt 
changes that could promote stable growth and a more equitable society. The 
result of a long participative process, the Constitution of  1988 altered impor- 
tant aspects of political, economic, and social life. In terms of fiscal policy, the 
major changes were the increase in the process of decentralization of tax reve- 
nues and the expansion of the welfare state. 
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compulsory intergovernmental tax revenue transfers from the central adminis- 
tration to the other two federated units increased. Second, the state and munici- 
pal tax base was enlarged, with a corresponding decrease in the tax base at the 
federal level. The new division benefited local and state governments, whose 
share of total disposable income increased, at a cost to the federal government. 
In  an attempt to improve social conditions, the Constitution of  1988 inte- 
grated and enlarged previous public programs in health, social insurance, and 
social assistance under a new order, denominated social security system. 
Public health remained a universal program available to all, regardless of age 
or economic condition. The scope of  social assistance was broadened. Social 
insurance was maintained as a pay-as-you-go system of benefits, due to work- 
ers of the private sector. Its main objective continued to be the maintenance of 
income in numerous circumstances, such as old age, disability, length of ser- 
vice, sickness, death, and maternity, as well as child benefits, among others. 
Most important, however, the Constitution imposed expensive obligations on 
the social insurance system, to be effective in 1989 or, at the latest, in 1992, 
without the accumulation of sufficient previous financing. The main measures 
in terms of  their impact on outlays were recalculation of the value of all ex- 
isting benefits, in order to recuperate their initial real value; periodic readjust- 
ment of benefits to maintain their real value through time; increase in the mini- 
mum value of benefits to one minimum wage (most rural workers received half 
this amount); and decrease in the age of retirement for rural workers (by five 
years for males and ten years for females). 
A new structure of taxation was designed to finance the higher level of ex- 
penditures of the health, social assistance, and social insurance programs. The 
federal budget was fragmented, and social security was granted its own budget 
(apart from the fiscal one). Since 1992, as a result of the fiscal changes pro- 
moted by the Constitution, social security contributions have surpassed federal 
fiscal revenues. 
The Brazilian economic environment was very unstable during the period 
that lasted from the formation of the National Assembly that gave rise to the 
Constitution of  1988 through the implementation of its main rules. In the six- 
year period from 1986 to 1991 the economy was subject to five stabilization 
plans, which were able to control price hikes for only short periods of time. In 
fact, as shown in table 8.1, inflation rates skyrocketed from an annual rate of 
65 percent in 1986 to 2,700 percent in 1993. From 1988 to 1992, average real 
GDP decreased by 0.3 percent and average real per capita income by 2 percent. 
Starting at the end of  1993 until July 1994, Brazil implemented a stabiliza- 
tion scheme known as the “Real Plan.” Policies were structured in three stages. 
The first stage, designed to improve federal fiscal revenues, was based on a 
temporary increase in taxes and decrease in constitutional compulsory trans- 
fers. The second stage lasted as long as four months. It consisted of a gradual 
conversion of wages and prices in a new monetary value, which by itself was 
adjusted daily. The objective was to eliminate distortions in relative prices pro- 180  Regina Villela Malvar 
Table 8.1  General Indicators, 1988-95 
GDP" 
(billion US.$  Populationb  Inflation Rate' 


































Nore: Exchange rate assumed to be  1.0917 U.S. dollars per real (BACEN 1996b, table 1.1). 
Walue for 1995 is from BACEN (1996b, table 1.1). Values for other years are calculated retroac- 
tively based on GDP real growth rate. 
bBACEN (1996b. table 1.2). 
'Indice Geral de Prqos;  Deflator Implicito.  FundaGIo Getlilio Vargas, Conjunfuru  EconBmica (Rio 
de Janeiro, May  1996). 
duced by years of high inflation, so that economic agents could again take the 
price system as a reliable indicator of investment opportunities. The third stage 
took place in July  1994, when all values were converted into the new cur- 
rency-the  real. 
Unlike plans implemented during 1986 to 1991, the Real Plan brought price 
stabilization. In 1995 Brazilians had the lowest annual rate of price increase in 
35 years: 15 percent. With inflation under control and an international environ- 
ment of sustainable growth, GDP grew by a yearly average rate of 4.8 percent 
from 1993 to 1995. In  1995 real per capita income reached U.S.$4,610, its 
highest level since 1987. 
Overvalued exchange rates and a process of import liberalization (in effect 
since 1990) were essential in containing price pressures, but they contributed 
in 1995 to the first trade deficit since 1980 (Banco Central do Brasil [BACEN] 
1996c, 121). High domestic interest rates and an international market in search 
of emerging economies were able to attract a net inflow of capital equivalent 
to 4.2 percent of GDP in 1995.*  As a result, in 1995, the balance of payments 
still registered a surplus equivalent to 1.8 percent of  GDP (BACEN 1996b, 
table IV.l). 
Public  national  debt  in  1995 represented  30  percent  of  GDP (BACEN 
1996b, table 111.13). In an attempt to make adjustments in public sector financ- 
ing, the central government is promoting reforms in the tax system, social in- 
surance, and public administration. The difficulty is that any one of these re- 
2. In  1994 and 1995 real annual federal securities rates were 25  and 34 percent, respectively. 
Data are from BACEN (1996a, table 11.24). 181  Generational Accounting in Brazil 
forms implies changes in the Constitution, which requires the approval, in two 
rounds of  voting, of three-fifths of  the members of Congress. 
An  important issue in fiscal reform is the complexity of the fiscal system. 
Brazil has approximately 80 taxes (Almeida and Cavalcanti 1995).  Of these, 14 
are fiscal taxes, 20 are social contributions, and the rest comprise a multitude of 
specific taxes and economic contributions. 
A related problem is the inefficiency caused by  overlapping bases of  inci- 
dence. There are two value-added taxes, one at the federal and another at the 
state level. In  addition, two social security contributions have  very  similar 
bases of  incidence-gross  revenue. What exacerbates the distortions is that 
each of these two  social security contributions is cumulative, since it is not 
based on  the concept of  value added and is applied in every stage of  pro- 
duction. 
The complexity of tax rules and overlapping bases of incidence have contrib- 
uted to the growth of  the informal economy, reducing even more the base of 
incidence of taxes and social contributions. In 1993 and 1994, when the Con- 
stitution was under general revision (and changes could be made by a smaller 
quorum) several proposals were made to reform the fiscal system. At that time, 
reactions by enraged taxpayers popularized proposals in favor of a unique tax 
on monetary transactions or a consumption tax on a small number of products, 
in place of  the actual fiscal system. 
Since 1988, the financing of social security and the scope of social insurance 
have been among the most debated topics of  government policy. The level of 
imposition to finance social security is high. Employers’ contributions are lev- 
ied on three different criteria: wage bill, gross revenue, and “social profits.” 
Employers pay, on average, a monthly tax of  22 percent levied on totaE payr011,~ 
a tax of 2 percent on gross revenue? and a tax of 8 percent on social  profit^.^ 
Workers contribute with a tax that varies from 8 to 11 percent of net wages up 
to a cap, and all levels of government are required to allocate resources to the 
social security budget. 
In 1991 and 1992, when most of the new rules regarding social insurance 
were implemented, it became apparent how feeble the structure of  social secu- 
rity financing really was. In 1988 social insurance benefits and welfare to the 
poor (old or disabled) consumed 57 percent of payroll contributions, whereas 
in 1992 this ratio had risen to 87 percent (MinistCrio da PrevidCncia e Assisten- 
cia Social [MPAS] 1995).  As social insurance and welfare consumed more and 
more of payroll contributions, less and less of that source could be transferred 
3. Employers contribute with an additional 5.8 percent levied on payroll to finance education 
4. To finance unemployment benefits and programs of economic development, there is an addi- 
5. The rules for financial institutions are different. As of  1996, they do not pay taxes on gross 
and programs of a private nature. 
tional tax of 0.65 percent levied on a basis that is very similar to gross revenue. 
revenue, but the levy on social profits is 18 percent. 182  Regina Villela Malvar 
to health (decreased from 28 percent in  1988 to 13 percent in 1992). At the 
same time, proceeds from other sources (gross revenues and  social profits) 
were not enough to finance the gap in health expenditures plus remaining so- 
cial security costs. 
Without conditions to promote radical changes in the structure of social se- 
curity, in  1993 the central administration started a cycle in which transitory 
taxes are created as soon as old ones expire. From 1993 to 1996, new legisla- 
tion (including three amendments to the Constitution) was introduced in an 
attempt to provide the system with enough financing.  As of 1996, public health 
has had an additional source of  revenues: a transitory tax of 0.20 percent on 
all monetary transactions, to be in effect until 1998. Another set of temporary 
taxes, aimed at the whole social security system, was in effect until 1997. 
Since 1994 revenues from payroll contributions have not been transferred to 
public health. Even so, social insurance is in a financial crisis. In  1995 and 
1996 expenditures with benefits consumed 94 percent from payroll contribu- 
tions. The ratio between the number of contributors and the number of benefi- 
ciaries dropped from 2.5 in  1982 to 1.8 in 1995 (Instituto Brasileiro de Geo- 
grafia e Estatistica [IBGE] 1982, 1995; MPAS  1994, 1995). The system does 
not count on a trust fund to ensure the payment of benefits when expenditures 
exceed revenues, or for the payment of  future benefits. In  1995, the average 
value of social insurance checks was  1.7 minimum wages6  This situation has 
imposed a policy dilemma. The system of collection imposes a heavy burden 
on economic agents and, perhaps as a consequence, is not able to provide 
enough financing. On the other hand, it is difficult to cut expenses because the 
majority of beneficiaries already receive low benefits. 
During the revision of the Constitution in 1993 and 1994 several proposi- 
tions tried to change the nature of  social insurance. A few recommended its 
privatization. Others suggested a system composed of two parts: (1) a compul- 
sory pay-as-you-go plan with a lower cap of  contributions and benefits and 
(2)  an optional plan based on capitalization. The final proposition addressed 
another very sensitive issue-social  security of federal public workers. In this 
regime, pensions and survival benefits correspond mainly to full earnings. The 
proposal suggested the integration of public workers (except the military) into 
the social insurance system and the adoption of  rules limiting the access to 
benefits within that unified regime. By that time, however, with general elec- 
tions only a few months away, the political environment did not support the 
approval of any relevant reforms. 
During 1996, most of the negotiations between the Congress and the federal 
government were channeled toward a constitutional amendment of  social in- 
surance. Due to strong political pressures, however, the proposition approved 
in the House of  Representatives did not change the structure of  social insur- 
6.  This represented 46 percent of the average remuneration of the economy (IBGE 1995). 183  Generational Accounting in Brazil 
ance. The plan preserves the basic characteristics of the social insurance sys- 
tem for private workers and increases the cap of contributions and benefits 
from eight to ten minimum wages. Public workers continue to have the right 
to receive full pensions, but access is restricted to those with more than  10 
years of service. As of  1997, the proposal is being discussed in the Senate, and 
it seems that the general lines approved in the House of Representatives will 
be maintained. 
Long-term prospects are dim. In addition to the problems emphasized be- 
fore, Brazil is experiencing swift changes in its demographic characteristics, 
particularly a decrease in the fertility rate and an aging population. The total 
fertility rate decreased from 5.8 in  1970 to 2.4 in the first half of  the 1990s. 
Between 1970 and 1991, the proportion of young generations decreased from 
43 to 35 percent; middle-aged cohorts expanded moderately, while the propor- 
tion of the elderly in the total population increased from 3 to 5 percent (Insti- 
tuto de Pesquisa Econ6micaAplicada [IPEA] 1996c, chap. 4). The Ministry of 
Social Insurance is particularly concerned. A smaller rate of growth of middle- 
aged cohorts and an aging population will add stress to the already debilitated 
pay-as-you-go system. Health officials expect increasing pressures because 
diseases typical of older generations are associated with high costs. 
To date, regardless of  many  distortions, social security remains under the 
same rules that created it. Radical changes will have to come, but no one knows 
when they will be made or how effective they will be. 
8.3  Description of Data Sources 
A broad database is required to produce generational accounts. It includes 
population projections; the age-sex composition of tax payments and transfer 
receipts; the value of  taxes, transfers, and government consumption; an esti- 
mate of government net debt; and alternative growth and interest rates. 
The Brazilian population was projected up to 2200. From 1995 to 2050 the 
estimates are from CELADE.’ In this scenario, the total fertility rate is equal 
to 2.1 in 2000, remaining at this level thereafter. Moreover, life expectancy 
improves over time for all age groups. In particular, life expectancy at birth is 
projected to increase from 67.9 years in 1995-2000  to 78.4 years in 2045-50. 
From 2050 to 2200, estimates followed a program of the Brazilian Bureau of 
Statistics.*  Baseline calculations were conducted under the assumption that the 
total fertility rate and age-sex mortality rates would remain constant at their 
7. CELADE is the Latin American Demographic Center. It is the institution within the United 
Nations organization ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) re- 
sponsible for population studies, including population projections. See Latin American Demo- 
graphic Center (1996). 
8. The program used to project Brazilian population from 2050 to 2200 was designed by  Fer- 
nando Femandes from DEPISABGE (see Femandes  1995). 184  Regina Villela Malvar 
Revenues  Amount 
Table 8.2  Public Sector Tax Revenues and Transfer Payments, 1995 (billions of 
U.S. dollars) 
Expenditures  Amount 
Labor income taxes  15.1 
Capital income taxes  13.2 
Value-added taxesr  69.4 
Social security contributions  62.7 
Payroll  31.2 
Gross revenueb  16.6 
Social profits  6.1 
Gross revenue: unemployment‘  6.4 
Federal public workers  2.3 
Other taxesd  38.9 
Total revenues  203.6 
Seigniorage  4.4 
Welfare 
Social insurance benefits: private workers 
Unemployment benefit‘ 
Other social security benefits 
Social security of  public workers 











Sources: IBGE, “Carga Tributiria 1994 e 1995” (Rio de Janeiro 1996); IBGE, “Tabula$Zo Especial: Trans- 
fergncias de Assisdncia e Previdgncia” (Rio de Janeiro,  1996); Ministirio da EducaGio e do Despono 
(1996); BACEN (1996a). 
Note; Exchange rate assumed to be 1.0917 US.  dollars per real. 
aIIncludes  tax on industrialized products (IPI), state value-added tax on the circulation of products (ICMS), 
and tax on credit, exchange rate, and insurance (IOF). 
bSocial contribution incident on gross revenue (COFINS) and allocated to social security. 
‘Social contribution incident on gross revenue (PISPASEP) and allocated to finance unemployment bene- 
fit and bonus to low-income workers. 
dIncludes state and local administrations taxes, tax to finance trust fund for employees (FGTS) and other 
taxes or social contributions. 
‘Includes unemployment benefit plus bonus to low-income workers. 
2050 levels until 2200. Because Brazil is considered a closed country in popu- 
lation  flows, the projection does not incorporate immigration or emigration 
variables. 
Table 8.2 shows the composition of  overall public sector tax revenues and 
transfer payments in  1995. Tax payments to federal, state, and local govern- 
ments include labor and capital income taxes,9 seigniorage, indirect taxes, and 
social security contributions. Transfer payments include welfare, social insur- 
ance benefits to private workers, unemployment benefits (including bonuses to 
low-income workers), social security to public workers, transfers paid by state 
and local governments to their public employees, expenditures with education, 
and other transfers.’O  It is worth noting  that the total value of  revenues  and 
expenditures  reported in table 8.2 does not coincide exactly with the value 
presented in national accounts statistics. There are two reasons for the differ- 
9. Capital income taxes were not adjusted to account for investment incentives. 
10. In the Brazilian national accounts, part of health expenditures are in government consump- 
tion and part in transfer payments. However, up to now, the available data do not permit the separa- 
tion of those amounts. Hence, it  was not possible to isolate health benefits and distribute their 
value across a health profile. 185  Generational Accounting in Brazil 
ence. First, the values in table 8.2 are in dollars and not in reals. Second, in 
table 8.2 revenues include seigniorage, and transfer payments include educa- 
tional expenditures. 
Specific age-sex profiles are used to distribute the total amount of the corre- 
sponding tax or transfer among males and females from ages 0 to 90. The 
distribution of income taxes and payroll contributions are from the Ministry of 
Finance database for 1994. The composition of indirect taxes is derived from 
the Brazilian Bureau of  Statistics 1987 Household Expenditure Survey. The 
age-sex profile of  social insurance benefits used in the baseline calculations 
refers to the Ministry of  Social Insurance database for 1992. To  account for 
changes in social insurance legislation, the profile for 1987 is used instead. 
Finally, the unemployment benefit profile corresponds to the Ministry of Labor 
composition for 1994. 
All profiles were benchmarked against national accounts values for 1995 
and seigniorage against the change in aggregate monetary base between De- 
cember 1994 and December 1995, as registered by the central bank. 
Public expenditure on preschool, elementary, middle, and superior educa- 
tion corresponds to the Ministry of Education estimates for 1995. These four 
kinds of expenses were distributed equally among the population of males and 
females of the appropriate educational category, 
The level of consumption of federal, state, and local governments (including 
consumption expenditures associated  with  social  security programs)  was 
U.S.$105.7 billion in 1995. This value was derived from national accounts sta- 
tistics and includes wage payments to public workers, government consump- 
tion of goods and services, and subsidies; it excludes educational expenditures. 
Government net debt for 1995 corresponds to internal and external govern- 
ment net debt held by federal, state, and local governments as well as public 
enterprises (BACEN 1996b, table 111.13). The expected present value of  re- 
sources to be obtained with privatization, estimated by  the Ministry of Plan- 
ning as 7 percent of GDP,"  was deducted from that amount. As a result, the 
value of  net  public  debt for  1995 used  in the calculations corresponds to 
$167.6 billion. 
Tax payments, transfer receipts, and government consumption after 1995 are 
projected by  assuming that the corresponding per capita values will grow at 
the same rate as the economy. Those future values are discounted to the base 
year of  1995 by using a specified interest rate. 
8.4  Brazilian Generational Accounts 
How much can living and future generations of Brazilians expect to pay to 
the government due to  current and alternative fiscal policies? How will the 
demographic transition and the reform of  social insurance in  1988 affect the 
11. Estimated at 7 percent of GDP (see Giambiagi and Pinheiro 1996) 186  Regina Villela Malvar 
Table 8.3  Generational  Accounts of Current and Future Generations: Baseline 
(thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Generation’s  Average  Males  Females 





















































































Nore: Growth rate assumed to be 1.5 percent; interest rate, 5 percent. 
fiscal burden of those currently alive and of future generations? Those are some 
of the questions addressed in this section. 
8.4.1  Baseline Results 
Table 8.3 shows baseline  generational  accounts as of  1995 for a typical 
member of a living generation between ages 0 and 90 years, and generational 
accounts for an average member of future generations  (those born after the 
base year of 1995). The baseline calculation assumes an economic growth rate 
of 1.5 percent and a rate of interest of 5 percent. It also assumes that current 
policies will prevail in the future. 
Column (1) of table 8.3 reports “net payments” of living and future genera- 
tions. “Net payment” is the difference between the present value of all taxes a 
typical member of each generation can expect to pay to the government over 
his or her remaining years of life and the present value of all transfers he or 
she can expect to receive from the government from the base year into the 
future. Generational accounts (net payments) are forward looking. They disre- 
gard net payments made in the past (before the base year of the calculations) 
and estimate remaining lifetime bills. 
Given the prospective nature of the calculations, net payments are smaller 187  Generational Accounting in Brazil 
for young cohorts, reach a maximum for those in middle age, and are negative 
for older living individuals. This life cycle pattern can be observed in table 
8.3. During the remaining years of  their lives, newborns can expect to pay 
U.S.$10,200 to the government. Net payments increase with age and reach a 
maximum value of  $3 1,300 at age 30. This happens because members of this 
age group are near the peak of their taxpaying years, while retirement is still 
some years away.  Generational accounts become negative at age 50, as the 
present value of transfer payments they will receive from the government out- 
weighs the present value of taxes they will pay during their remaining years of 
life. Net payments decrease for older cohorts and reach a minimum at age 65, 
when they can expect to receive net transfers from the government of $33,400. 
Finally, the value of future net payments increases for those aged 70 or older, 
because they are approaching the end of their lives (90 years) and so have a 
reduced number of transfers to receive from the government. 
As reported in table 8.3, lifetime net payments for an average member of 
future generations amount to $22,100, which is 116 percent higher than ex- 
pected net payments of newborns. This means that if the current path of fiscal 
policies prevails in  the future, generations born after  1995 will have to pay 
much more in taxes and social  security contributions throughout  their life- 
times, or will receive much less in benefits (or a combination of both), than 
those born in 1995. 
Table 8.3 also shows an assessment of how generational accounts differ ac- 
cording to gender. During working years males pay more taxes than females, 
and during inactivity they generally receive more than their female counter- 
parts. The contrast arises because women receive lower wages than men and 
have lower rates of participation in the labor market. Moreover, since in Brazil 
the value of pensions is a function of workers’ wages and years of contribution, 
women are entitled to receive, on average, lower social insurance checks than 
men. Those differences are highlighted by what happens at age 35: remaining 
net payments of  a typical male in this age group ($45,600) are four times 
higher than net payments of his female counterpart ($10,800). 
Generational accounting methodology also shows that in Brazil women start 
collecting pensions earlier than men. As  table 8.3 shows, on average, women 
at age 45 can expect to receive, during their remaining years of life, a net 
transfer from the government of $4,900, while men in the same age group can 
expect to pay, over their remaining years, a net amount of $19,400. The contrast 
can be attributed to different eligibility criteria for granting social insurance 
benefits. Females from the urban sector can retire at age 60 and males at age 
65. For rural workers the age limits are lower: 55 years for women and 60 years 
for men. Females can start receiving length-of-service pensions after 25 years 
of work, while for men the minimum required is 30 years. 
A detailed description of the distribution of different payments and receipts 
among age groups is reported in table 8.4. The present value of  remaining 
income tax payments and payroll contributions is concentrated among those Table 8.4  Composition  of Generational Accounts: Present Value of Payments and Receipts (thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Payments  Receipts 
Social Security  Social Security 
Social 
Social  Security of  State and 
Net Revenue  Insurance  Federal  Mu  n  i c  i  p  a  I 
Generation’s  Income  Payroll  and Social  of private  Public  Transfer 




















3.8  9.5 
4.4  11.0 
5.3  13.1 
6.2  15.3 
7.2  17.3 
8.5  18.1 
9.8  18.1 
10.6  17.3 
10.6  15.7 
10.1  13.5 
8.8  11.6 
7.3  8.2 
6.2  6.0 
4.7  4.2 
3.7  2.5 
2.8  1.6 
2.3  1.1 
1.6  0.8 




















3.4  0.9  5.7  0.6 
3.9  1.0  6.6  0.7 
4.7  1.2  7.9  0.7 
5.5  1.4  9.2  0.8 
6.2  1.6  10.8  0.9 
6.5  1.7  12.5  1.2 
6.6  1.6  14.0  1.2 
6.3  1.6  14.7  1.2 
5.6  1.4  14.0  1.3 
4.8  1.2  12.4  1.5 
4.0  1.0  10.0  1.7 
2.7  0.7  7.4  1.9 
1.9  0.5  5.3  2.3 
1.2  0.3  2.7  2.6 
0.6  0.2  0.5  3.1 
0.4  0.1  0.1  3.4 
0.2  0.1  0.0  3.7 
0.2  0.0  0.0  3.8 
0.0  0.0  0.0  0.9 
4.9  1.8  0.5  2.4 
5.1  1.8  0.6  2.7 
6.8  1.7  0.7  3.2 
7.9  1.7  0.8  3.8 
9.2  1.6  0.9  4.4 
10.8  1.6  0.8  5.1 
12.7  1.5  0.7  6.1 
14.9  1.4  0.6  7.1 
17.2  1.3  0.4  8.3 
20.1  1.2  0.3  9.8 
22.4  1.1  0.2  11.0 
22.7  1.0  0.1  11.2 
23.5  0.9  0.0  11.7 
21.7  0.7  0.0  10.9 
17.9  0.6  0.0  9.1 
11.2  0.5  0.0  5.7 
6.8  0.4  0.0  3.5 
4.0  0.3  0.0  2.0 









































Note:  Growth rate assumed to be 1.5 percent; interest rate, 5 percent. 
’Includes seigniorage, tax to finance the trust fund for employees (FGTS), and remaining taxes. 189  Generational Accounting in Brazil 




Baseline  116.4 
Zero debt  99.0 
No demographic change  64.1 
Note:  Growth rate assumed to be  1.5 percent; interest rate, 5 percent. 
between ages 30 and 45, whereas the payment of indirect taxes (value-added 
taxes and gross revenue contributions) is distributed over a wider range of ages 
(5 to 50). Welfare is targeted toward older cohorts, since most assistance bene- 
fits in Brazil go to the old poor. Social insurance payments for private and 
public workers are highest for those at age 60. Those between ages 25 and 55 
also benefit substantially  from social insurance,  as this program comprises 
a wide range of  benefits regardless of  age, such as disability and length-of- 
service pensions and survival benefits payable to the living spouse. Educational 
expenditures are targeted to younger cohorts, reflecting the concentration of 
public funds on elementary education. 
The burden imposed on future generations would be lower if the public sec- 
tor did not hold any debt or if the structure of the population remained constant 
in the future. Table 8.5 outlines some of the sources of intergenerational imbal- 
ance and compares the associated burdens with the baseline calculation. In the 
absence of public sector debt, net payments of future generations would be 99 
percent higher than those of  newborns. In a hypothetical scenario where the 
population of each age cohort is maintained constant from 1995 to 2200, un- 
born generations would have to pay on average 64 percent more than new- 
borns. Why is the burden imposed on future generations lower in these two 
cases than in the baseline calculation? A smaller net debt (in the absence of 
changes in the current path of  government consumption expenditures or in net 
payments it will receive from living generations) means that the government 
can reduce the net payments it will impose on future generations and still bal- 
ance its intertemporal budget constraint. With a constant population structure, 
the proportion of old cohorts in the total population will remain constant over 
time and, as a consequence, will not constitute an increasing pressure on the 
level of transfer payments. 
What can be done to ensure that future generations will not have to pay more 
to the government than today’s newborns? Table 8.6 reports spending cuts and 
tax increases required to eliminate generational imbalance. In all cases, consid- 
erable changes are necessary. Net payments of  future generations will equal 
those of newborns if the level of government consumption, net of educational 
expenditures, decreases by 26.2 percent. Equilibrium between current and fu- 
ture newborns can also be attained if total revenue has an immediate and per- 
manent increase of 11.7 percent, or if the value of all transfer payments has an 190  Regina Villela Malvar 
Table 8.6  Spending Cuts or Tax Increases Required to Eliminate 
Generational Imbalance 
Change 
Cut or Increase 
W) 
Cut in government purchases  26.2 
Increase in all tax revenues  11.7 
Cut in all transfer payments  17.9 
Increase in payroll contributions  74.1 
47.2  Cut in social insurance outlays 
Nore: Growth rate assumed to be 1.5 percent; interest rate, 5 percent. 
immediate and permanent reduction of 17.9 percent. Alternatively, if only the 
social insurance program is adjusted, a 74 percent increase in revenues from 
payroll taxes or a 47.2 percent reduction in all outlays is required to produce 
balance. 
8.4.2  Impact of Changes in Social Insurance 
As discussed earlier, the implementation of  the Constitution of  1988 sub- 
stantially increased the level of social insurance outlays. The objective of this 
section is to investigate how baseline generational accounts would be affected 
if  the Constitution of  1988 had not changed the structure of social insurance 
benefits. This is a purely hypothetical exercise and was conducted only with 
the purpose of illustrating how social insurance reform can affect living and 
future generations in opposite ways. 
To  explore this hypothetical situation it is necessary to assume that social 
insurance legislation in 1995 is the same as it was in 1988 (the last year of the 
old legal regime). For that, some of the baseline values need to be revised. 
First, the profile of  social insurance and welfare outlays for 1987 is used, so as 
to capture the age-sex composition of benefits prior to the reform. Second, the 
hypothetical value of  benefits in 1995 under the old rules is estimatedI2 and 
used instead of the observed level of outlays, so as to incorporate the lower 
level of expenditures before the reform. With those corrections it is possible to 
project net payments of current and future generations under the old social 
insurance rules. Those results can then be compared with the baseline calcula- 
tions, which reflect current policy. 
Table 8.7 shows net payments of living and future generations of males and 
females for the scenarios “current policy” and “old social insurance rules,’’ as 
well as the absolute and relative differences between them. The conclusion is 
that the reform of  1988 involved a substantial redistribution of resources to- 
ward living generations at the expense of those born in the future. As the last 
12. This was done by assuming that the average value of benefits in 1995 would be equal to the 
average value of  benefits observed in  1988 times the number of  beneficiaries that would have 
existed in 1995 had the law not changed (and rural workers had to retire at later ages). Table 8.7  Impact of Changes in Social Insurance Legislation: Net Payments of Males and Females (thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Males  Females 
Current  Old Social  Current  Old Social 
Policy  Insurance  Absolute  Relative  Policy  Insurance  Absolute  Relative 
Generation’s  (baseline)  Rules  Difference  Difference (%)  (baseline)  Rules  Difference  Difference (%) 
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row of table 8.7 shows, if social insurance rules had not changed, unborn gen- 
erations would pay 9.7 percent more than newborns. Under current policy, the 
burden facing future generations is much greater, since they can expect to pay 
116 percent more than newborns. 
Why were future generations left with this sizable burden? The reason is 
that since all members of living generations can expect to receive, during their 
remaining years of life, higher transfer payments  from the government,  the 
only way  to balance  the government  intertemporal budget constraint (in the 
absence of a reduction in consumption expenditures or the debt) is to increase 
net payments to be received from future generations. 
An additional result drawn from this analysis is that even though social in- 
surance reform benefited all members of living generations, the gains were not 
distributed uniformly across all age groups or between males and females. To 
see this, it is useful to look at the absolute and relative difference columns 
presented  in table 8.7. The first reports the absolute difference between  net 
payments (taxes minus transfers) under current policy and net payments under 
the old social insurance rules. The absolute difference is negative for all age 
cohorts of living generations, indicating that as a result of the reform, males 
and females currently alive can expect to receive higher levels of transfer pay- 
ments  than  they  would  otherwise.  The relative  difference  is  negative  for 
younger  cohorts, showing that under current policy  they  will have to make 
lower net payments than they would under the old social insurance rules. That 
difference is positive for older cohorts, indicating that with current policy they 
will receive higher levels of net transfer payments than they would otherwise. 
All members of current generations are better off, but males aged 60 to 80 
gained more than other males and females aged 45 to 70 benefited more than 
other females. This can be seen in the absolute difference columns. For ex- 
ample, if the old rules still prevailed, net payments of a typical male aged 65 
would be -U.S.$25,500  (indicating that during his remaining years of life, 
transfer receipts exceed tax payments). Under the new rules, his expected net 
payment is -$44,300.  The difference of $18,800 represents what he can ex- 
pect to receive  in terms of higher social insurance benefits. Why did older 
cohorts benefit more than younger ones? The new rules increased the value of 
all existing benefits  and hence represented  a sizable gain for those already 
receiving social insurance checks. Younger cohorts also benefited from the re- 
form, but their gain will occur only in the future. Since all the calculations are 
in present value terms, a payment received today has a higher present value 
than the same payment received in the future. 
Another conclusion is that women benefited  more than men. This can be 
seen by noting  that the absolute value of  the relative difference columns is 
always higher for women than for men in the same age cohort. This pattern 
probably accrues because some aspects of the new legislation favored women 
more than men: the retirement age for female rural workers was reduced more 
than for male rural  workers, and female workers gained the right to ask for 
length-of-service retirement earlier than males. 193  Generational Accounting in Brazil 
8.4.3  Sensitivity Analysis 
The baseline result gives generational accounts for a particular choice of 
parameters. It is useful, then, to measure how the calculations would change if 
a different set of values were more appropriate. 
Table 8.8 shows net payments of living and future generations for reasonable 
assumptions regarding productivity growth and interest rates. The choice of 
these parameters affects the burden to be imposed on future generations, but it 
does not change the overall conclusion that if current fiscal policies, including 
social insurance, are maintained in the future, net payments of unborn genera- 
tions will be much higher than those of newborns. 
The calculations are sensitive to the hypothesis regarding the population 
projection, as well. Those results are reported in table 8.9. If the structure of 
the population observed in 1995 remained constant in the future, that is, in the 
absence of  an aging population and a declining fertility rate, the burden on 
future generations would be 64 percent higher than that on newborns. Different 
assumptions concerning the behavior of the fertility rate also affect the results. 
If the number of children per woman of reproductive age remains at 2.1 after 
2000, future generations will pay  116 percent more than newborns. However, 
if the total fertility rate falls from 2.1 to 1.8 after 2055, net payments of unborn 
generations will be 349 percent higher than those of newborns. This happens 
because with lower fertility rates there will be fewer members of future genera- 
tions left to pay the bills not paid by current generations. 
8.4.4  Effect of Policy Changes 
Another important application of  generational accounting is to assess how 
policy changes affect net payments of different generations. Table 8.10 reports 
generational accounts of males and females under three alternative scenarios. 
A general conclusion drawn from these experiments is that policy changes are 
not neutral with respect to gender or age. 
In Brazil, given the high level of payroll taxes, one proposition often sug- 
gested is a shift in the tax base, from payroll contributions to value-added taxes. 
As column (2) of table 8.10 shows, this change in tax structure benefits males 
aged 0 to 60 as their net payment to the government declines. Young females 
and older cohorts of both sexes lose, since they will have to pay higher taxes 
than they would otherwise. Why do the elderly lose? They did not pay payroll 
taxes and hence do not benefit from their elimination, but they are hurt by 
higher value-added taxes. Young females are worse off because the ratio of 
young females’ to young males’ indirect tax payments is higher than the ratio 
of payroll taxes. As a result, an increase in indirect taxes hurts young females 
more than young males, and a cut in payroll taxes favors young males more 
than young females. 
The second experiment is a 1 percent increase in social insurance expendi- 
tures every year until 2030. All living generations gain from this measure, since 
they benefit from higher transfers from the government. Females gain more Table 8.8  Sensitivity with Respect to Productivity Growth and Discount Rate (U.S. dollars) 
g=l  g = 1.5  g=2 
r=3  r=5  r=7  r=3  r=5  r=7  r=  3  r=5  r=7 
Net Payments 
Present generation  15,726  8,498  3,579  17,304  10,229  4,611  18,174  12,097  5,811 
Future generations  35,203  18,791  10,481  40,840  22,132  12,080  46,79 1  26,042  1494  1 
Generational imbalance 
(% difference)  123.9  121.1  192.8  136.0  116.4  162.0  157.5  115.3  141.6 
Note:  g is productivity growth (percent); r is interest rate (percent). Table 8.9  Sensitivity with Respect to Population Parameters 
Assumption Regarding Population 
Generational 
Imbalance (%) 
Constant population structure from 1995 to 2200 
Fertility rate of 2.1  after 2000 (baseline) 




Nore: Growth rate assumed to be  1.5 percent; interest ratc, 5 percent. 
Table 8.10  Generational  Accounting under Alternative Policy Changes: Net 
Payments of Males and Females (thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Reduction in 
Switch from  Increase in Social  Government 
Payroll to  Insurance Benefits  Consumption 
Value-Added  by  1  % Every  by 2% Every 
Generation’s  Baseline  Taxes  Year until 2030  Year until 2200 
























































































































-  1.8 
5.9 
107.3 
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than males. Women in their 40s and men in  their 50s profit more than the 
other age groups, since they are closer to retirement and will be granted higher 
pensions during their entire period of inactivity. The gain to living generations, 
however, hurts future generations, whose burden is 250 percent higher than 
that of current newborns. 
The last experiment is a reduction in government consumption by 2 percent 
every year until 2200. This policy does not change what living generations pay 
or receive from the government because it does not entail alterations in tax 
policy or social security transfers. As a result, the beneficiaries of a thriftier 
government are future generations who face lower net payments. 
8.5  Conclusions 
The application of generational accounting to the Brazilian case suggests 
that if the actual path of fiscal policies, including social insurance, remains un- 
changed, future generations will face a burden 116 percent higher than current 
newborns. 
What are the sources of intergenerational imbalance in the Brazilian situa- 
tion? The level of public debt and an aging population associated with lower 
fertility rates can partially explain why expected net payments of future gener- 
ations are much higher than those of current generations. Most of the imbal- 
ance, however, can be attributed to the changes in social insurance legislation 
brought by  the Constitution of  1988. The reform increased the value of  all 
existing benefits and decreased the age for retirement of rural workers without 
securing appropriate financing. If  this windfall to the initial elderly had not 
taken place, the burden on future generations would be 9.7 percent higher than 
that on newborns, which is significantly lower than the burden associated with 
current social insurance policy. 
Several measures can ensure that future generations will not pay more to 
the government than current newborns. They encompass a cut in government 
spending by 26.2 percent, an increase in revenues from taxes and social contri- 
butions by  11.7 percent, or a reduction in all transfer payments to public and 
private workers by  17.9 percent. Any of those changes are, without doubt, ex- 
tremely hard to accomplish. However, if relevant corrections are postponed to 
a later date, the intergenerational imbalance against future generations  gets 
even worse. For instance, if during the next five years the Brazilian government 
is unable to promote structural reforms in fiscal policies, generations born five 
years from now will face a burden 153 percent higher than that on newborns. 
And if the lag period is ten years, the onus will be almost 200 percent. 
Another  important  lesson  from  generational  accounting  is  that  policy 
changes are not neutral with respect to gender or age. For example, a shift in 
the tax base from payroll to indirect taxes helps current males but hurts young 
females and the elderly. The social insurance  reform  of  1988 benefited all 197  Generational Accounting in Brazil 
members of living generations, but in general, women gained more than men 
and the current elderly gained more than young and middle-aged cohorts. 
Finally, why  should  Brazilian  policymakers  or politicians  be  concerned 
about the burden on future generations? The government strives, almost daily, 
to find resources to pay public employees, keep hospitals open, and pay current 
retirees. The answer is that the intergenerational distribution of resources can 
have important consequences for a nation’s capacity to save. For instance, if 
the marginal propensity  to consume out of  remaining lifetime income rises 
with age, policies that increase social insurance benefits (like the reform of 
1988)  may tend to stimulate current consumption and reduce domestic savings. 
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